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AND TRANSFORMING A DUSTY, 
OLD PUNITIVE APPROACH TO 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE INTO A 
VIABLE PRESCRIPTION FOR 
REHABILITATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several cases imposing discipline on attorneys for acts of 
domestic violence have arisen in the United States.1 Overall, 
courts agree that suspension is the appropriate degree of 
sanction to impose in these cases.2 Courts further agree that 
1 See, e.g., Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1985); In re 
Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d 729 (1985); In re Runyon, 49 N.E. 2d 189 (Ind. 1986); In re Otto, 48 
Cal. 3d 970 (1989); In re Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d 571 (1990); In re Walker, 597 N.E.2d 
1271 (Ind. 1992); People v. Wallace, 837 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1992); People v. Senn, 824 
P.2d 822 (Colo. 1992); People v. Knight, 883 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1994); In re Magid, 655 
A.2d 916 (N.J. 1995); In re Principato, 655 A.2d 920 (N.J. 1995); In re Howard, 673 
A.2d 800 (N.J. 1996); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prorl Ethics and Conduct v. Polson, 569 
N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1997); People v. Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1997); People v. 
Shipman, 943 P.2d 458 (Colo. 1997); People v. Reaves, 943 P.2d 460 (Colo. 1997); In re 
Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378 (N.J. 1997); People v. Musick, 960 P.2d 89 (Colo. 1998); At-
torney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Painter, 739 A.2d 24 (Md. 1999); In re Van Bus-
kirk, 981 P.2d 607 (Colo. 1999). 
2 See Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d 571 (imposing a 30-day actual suspension); Howard, 673 
A.2d 800 (imposing a 3-month actual suspension); Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378 (impos-
ing a 3-month actual suspension); Wallace, 837 P.2d 1223 (imposing a 3-month actual 
suspension); Walker, 597 N.E.2d 1271 (imposing a 6-month actual suspension); Ship-
man, 943 P.2d 458 (imposing a 6-month actual suspension); Knight, 883 P.2d 1055 
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imposing discipline on attorneys for non-professional miscon-
duct is appropriate to protect the public, preserve the reputa-
tion and integrity of the legal profession, and enhance public 
confidence in attorneys.3 However, uniformity in the discipli-
nary process is lacking.4 As a result, attorneys who commit 
acts of domestic violence have no way of anticipating the level 
of professional discipline that they may receive. More impor-
tantly, the public cannot anticipate the level of discipline that 
domestically violent attorneys will receive; this is important 
since a primary goal of attorney discipline in these cases is to 
enhance public confidence in the profession. These are the 
major shortcomings of the current approach to disciplining at-
torneys who engage in acts of domestic violence. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss (1) the prevalence of 
domestic violence in America, (2) the governmental responses 
to domestic violence, and (3) preserving the integrity of the le-
gal profession. This Comment will then focus on how discipli-
nary courts have treated domestically violent attorneys. Part 
III examines the murky judicial approach to disciplining do-
mestically violent attorneys, and Part IV criticizes that ap-
proach. Finally, Part V sets forth a proposal to cure the ill ef-
fects of the current approach, by injecting a greater degree of 
uniformity, ease, predictability and certainty into the discipli-
nary process. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Before focusing specifically on domestically violent attor-
neys, a general discussion of the prevalence of domestic vio-
lence in the United States is necessary to recognize the poten-
tial for such disciplinary cases arising in the future. 5 
Additionally, an examination of some of the federal and Cali-
actual suspension); Otto, 48 Cal. 3d 970 (imposing a 6-month actual suspension); 
Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (imposing a l-year-and-l-day actual suspension); Musick, 
960 P.2d 89 (imposing a l-year-and-l-day actual suspension); Polson, 569 N.W.2d 612 
(imposing a 2-year actual suspension); Van Buskirk, 981 P.2d 607 (imposing a 3-year 
actual suspension); Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798 (imposing an indefinite suspension 
with eligibility for reinstatement after 3 months). 
3 See, e.g., Nevill, 39 Cal 3d at 736. 
4 See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Stan-
dards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1. 
5 See discussion infra Parts II.A.l, II.B.l. 
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fornia governmental responses to domestic violence will high-
light the important seat this issue has taken in American so-
ciety.6 Further, a brief introduction to the doctrines 
underlying the rationale for disciplining attorney misconduct 
is necessary for a better understanding of the process.7 Fi-
nally, a discussion of how disciplinary courts have dealt with 
domestically violent attorneys will underscore the problems 
underlying the current approach to the problem, specifically 
inconsistency and unpredictability.s 
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A NATIONAL GLIMPSE 
1. The Prevalence of Domestic Violence in America 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Re-
port estimated that in 1995 close to 58,000 of 214,464 victims 
of violence were related to the offender.9 In 1998, although the 
ratio remained the same,lO the actual number of incidents al-
most doubled. ll Victims of reported violence increased to 
421,493, while the number of those victims that were related 
to the offenders increased to 112,042.12 Moreover, a Bureau of 
Justice Statistics (hereinafter "BJS") special report estimated 
that in 1998 about one million violent crimes occurred among 
persons intimately involved13 with one another.14 These 
figures indicate that domestic violence is a metastasizing na-
tional problem. 
6 See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2. 
7 See infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text. 
S See discussion infra Part II.D.1-3. 
9 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, THE STRUCTURE 
OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED INCIDENTS, at 4 (1995). 
10 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, INCIDENTS OF 
FAMILY VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF 1998 NIBRS DATA, at 280 (1998). 
11 See id. 
12 See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 9. 
13 See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON AND SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTI-
MATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, at 8 (2000) (defining intimate partner relationships as those 
involving former or current spouses, former or current boy/girlfriends that may be of 
the same gender). 
14 See id. at 1 (noting a 21% decrease from the 1993 statistics on intimate part-
ner violence committed against women, whereas intimate violence committed against 
men stayed about the same). 
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Even more alarming is the fact that between 1993 and 
1998, the BJS estimates that only about half of all domestic 
violence victims reported the incidents to the authorities. 15 
The reason most often given by victims for not reporting the 
violence was that they considered the incident to be a "private 
or personal matter."16 The second-most cited reason for not re-
porting these incidents was fear of reprisal by the offenderP 
Other reasons given by victims who did not report the inci-
dents included the following: (1) the minor nature of the 
crime; (2) presumed police apathy; (3) the victim's desire to 
protect the offender; (4) fear of police bias; (5) inconvenience 
of filing a report; (6) the victims had already reported the in-
cident to another official; (7) the perception that the police 
would be ineffective at preventing the offender from abusing 
again; and (8) the victim's uncertainty as to whether a crime 
had actually occurred.1S Based on the BJS statistics and its 
survey of victims, adding the unreported incidents to the re-
ported incidents could double the number of acts of domestic 
violence that occur in the United States.19 
2. The National Effort to Stem the Occurrence of Domestic 
Violence 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Family Violence Prevention 
and Services Act (hereinafter "FVPSA").20 The FVPSA states 
two goals. Its first goal is to assist states in increasing public 
awareness of domestic violence.21 Its second goal is to provide 
funding for family violence education and training to states, 
local public agencies,22 and nonprofit private organizations.23 
Under the FVPSA, the federal government provides grants to 
15 See id. at 7, Table 7. 
16 See id. at 7, Table 8 (reporting 35% of female victims and 52% of male 
victims). 
17 See id. (reporting 19% of female victims and not reporting for male victims). 
18 See RENNISON & WELCHANS, supra note 13. 
19 See id. 
20 42 US.C §§ 10401-10418 (2000). 
21 See id. § 10401 (stating goals of providing shelter and related services to do-
mestic violence victims). 
22 See id. § 10401(2) (defining public agencies as including law enforcement, 
courts, legal and social services and health care professionals). 
23 See id. 
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states to further these goals.24 
Continuing its efforts to combat domestic violence, Con-
gress enacted the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (here-
inafter "VAWA").25 Under the VAWA, the United States Attor-
ney General provides grants to eligible states for use in the 
prevention of domestic violence by earmarking funds for state 
level programs. In total, VAWA provides $3.3 billion in state 
grants to be used for such purposes as providing social and le-
gal services for domestic violence victims, as well as establish-
ing battered women shelters.26 
Additional grants are available to states that demonstrate 
increases in the percentage of either arrests or time served 
for violent crimes.27 The Attorney General may also grant 
24 See id. § 10402; see also 42 U.S.C. § 10403(a)(1) (granting to each qualifying 
state up to $400,000 per year); id. § 10404 (requiring the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to oversee the FVPSA); id. § 10405 (requiring 
the Secretary to report to congress biannually to assess the FVPSA's efficacy). 
25 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 13701-13712 (2000). The purpose of the VAWA is reflected in 
its subtitle: "Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-In-Sentencing Incentive 
Grants." See id. § 13708 (a) (1) (A-E) (2000) (providing appropriations of over $997 
million in authorized appropriations to eligible states for the 1996 fiscal year and 
providing for these amounts to increase yearly until 2000. For the 1997 fiscal year, 
over $1.3 billion were made available to states. In 1998, that amount increased to 
over $2.5 billion. In the 1999 fiscal year over $2.6 billion were available. In 2000, the 
fmal fiscal year provided for in the VAWA, over $2.75 billion were made available to 
states to subsidize the incarceration of violent offenders to facilitate a greater amount 
of prison time actually served.). 
26 These grants will continue under VAWA 2000, which was passed by Congress 
on October 12, 2000. VAWA 2000 provides $3.3 billion in state grants, through 2005 
for the following purposes "$200 million to provide civil and legal services to victims 
of domestic and sexual violence; $875 million for shelter services for battered women; 
$140 million to address violence against women on college campuses; programs to 
fund transitional housing for women fleeing domestic violence; grant programs to 
help service providers address the needs of women with disabilities who are victims 
of domestic and sexual violence; and significant protections for battered immigrant 
women, who can face immigration law consequences if they seek to flee from or sup-
port prosecution of their abuser." See VAWA Passes!, The Family Violence Prevention 
Fund Website, (visited October 12, 2000) <http://www.fvpf.orglnewsflash>. To qualify 
for these grants, a state must apply to the U.S. Attorney General. See 42 U.S.C. § 
13703(b) (2000). In doing so, the state must declare that its correctional policies and 
programs ensure the following: (1) violent offenders serve a su1;>stantial portion of 
their sentences, (2) severe punishment for violent offenders, and (3) the prison time 
served reflects the determination that the offender is violent. See 42 U.S.C. § 
13703(a). 
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 13703(b)(1-2). 
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funds to states that demonstrate an increase in the combined 
percentage of persons arrested and prison timed served for vi-
olent crimes.28 States become eligible for additional VAWA 
grants by demonstrating increases of 10% or more in the 
number of offenders convicted of violent crimes and sentenced 
to prison within the most recent 3-year period.29 Accordingly, 
funding for state programs, such as the one proposed by this 
Comment,30 that strike at domestic violence is available.31 
States may also qualify for truth-in-sentencing grants 
under the VAWA.32 These grants are available to states that 
have implemented sentencing laws that require violent offend-
ers to serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed.33 Grants 
are also available to states that plan to implement sentencing 
laws requiring persons convicted of violent crimes to actually 
serve at least 85% of the sentence imposed.34 Finally, states 
that prescribe indeterminate sentences may qualify for truth-
in-sentencing grants by showing that violent offenders serve, 
on average, at least 85% of either "the prison term estab-
lished under the State's sentencing and release guidelines35 
[ . .. ] or [ ... ] the maximum prison term allowed" under 
the court imposed sentence.36 Giving needed support to the 
national fight against domestic violence, states, such as Cali-
fornia, have also committed resources to that cause. 
B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALIFORNIA GLIMPSE 
1. The Prevalence of Domestic Violence in California 
California's Criminal Justice Statistics Center (hereinaf-
ter "CJSC") reported 56,892 arrests for domestic violence in 
28 See id. § 13703(c)(1). 
29 See id. § 13703(c)(2). 
30 See infra Part V. 
31 Although truth-in-sentencing legislation does note directly combat domestic vi-
olence, when states adopt such sentencing guidelines, and thus qualify for federal 
funds under VAWA, that money is earmarked for use in preventing and treating do-
mestic violence. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, supra note 26. 
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 13704. 
33 See id. § 13704(a)(1)(B) (suggesting that states may qualify intentionally or by 
happenstance). 
34 See id. § 13704(a)(2). 
35 See id. § 13704(a)(3)(A). 
38 See id. § 13704(a)(3)(B). 
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1998.37 That number grew from 31,886 arrests in 1988.38 In 
1988, approximately 114 out of every 100,000 persons of Cali-
fornia's total population were arrested for domestic violence.39 
In 1998, that ratio grew to nearly 170 arrests per 100,000 
persons.40 Accordingly, domestic violence arrests in California 
are on the rise at a rate of over 3% per year.41 The CJSC sug-
gests that "public awareness influenced by high profile 
cases,42 women's resource centers and shelters, and new legis-
lation" may be factors behind this rise in arrests.43 
2. California's Fight against Domestic Violence 
California has taken an active role to eliminate domestic 
violence.44 In 1986, California's legislature enacted Senate Bill 
(hereinafter "SB") 1472, requiring police officers to: (1) treat 
domestic violence as a criminal act; (2) create new guidelines 
for handling domestic violence cases; (3) attend domestic vio-
lence training programs; and (4) track domestic violence inci-
dents.45 This legislation seeks to improve police response to 
domestic violence. 
In 1988, the state assembly followed the senate's lead by 
enacting Assembly Bill (hereinafter "AB") 1599.46 AB 1599 re-
quires the presiding judge of the Superior Court in each 
county to designate at least one judicial official to issue tem-
porary restraining orders to protect victims, and their chil-
37 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFO. AND ANALYSIS, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON AR-
RESTS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1998, 1 CRIM. JUST. STAT. CENTER REPORT 
SERIES 3, at 7, Table 1 (1999). 
38 See id. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. Note that 1994, the year of the O.J. Simpson murder trial, hosted the 
largest increase (10.3%) in the rate of arrests for domestic violence from the previous 
year, whereas 1998 hosted the largest decrease (12%) in the rate of domestic violence 
arrests from the previous year. 
42 See The Your Family's Health Website (visited February 15, 2001) <http:// 
www.yourfamilyshealth.com!community_healthldome stic/> (pointing out that the O.J. 
Simpson and Warren Moon cases have raised public awareness of domestic violence 
to a new level.). 
43 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFO. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 5 . 
.. See id. 
45 See id. at 5-6. 
46 See id. at 6. 
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dren, from domestic violence during periods when court is not 
in sessionY A potential victim of domestic violence may seek 
this protective order by informing the police of a recent inci-
dent or threat of domestic violence that has occurred.48 The 
judicial official may then issue the order after a police officer 
"asserts reasonable grounds to believe that a person is in im-
mediate and present danger of domestic violence."49 
Further, in 1987, the state legislature amended California 
Penal Code Section 12028.550 to authorize police officers to 
seize firearms found at domestic violence scenes. 51 When the 
police have reasonable cause to believe that returning the 
weapon will endanger someone within the household, they 
may petition the court, within 30 days of the confiscation, 52 to 
determine whether the firearm should be returned.53 Thus, 
the legislature has empowered local law enforcement agencies 
with the means to prevent more serious, perhaps even fatal, 
injuries to domestic violence victims. 
Enacted in 1995,54 SB 132, amended California Penal 
Code Section 13519.55 This amendment requires patrol officers 
to attend domestic violence training sessions biannually. 56 
47 See A.B. 1599, 1987-1988 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1988), codified at CAL. Crv. CODE § 
4359 (2000). CAL. Crv. CODE § 4359 was repealed by Stats.1993, c. 219 (A.B.1500), § 
39.5. But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 6300, et.seq., continuing former CAL. Crv. CODE § 4359 
without substantive change. 
48 See sources cited supra note 47. 
49 See sources cited supra note 47. 
50 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 12028.5(b), amended by S.B. 2025, Regular Sess. 1999-
2000 (Cal. 2000). (allowing the seizure of a firearm when the firearm is in plain sight 
of the police officer or after a consensual search necessary to protect the officer or 
others). 
51 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFO. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 6. 
52 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12028.5, amended by S.B. 2025, Regular Sess. 1999-
2000 (Cal. 2000). (enabling the police to request an extension to 60 days). 
53 See id. 
54 See The California Senate Website (visited September 4, 2000) <http:// 
info.sen.ca.gov/pub/95-96/billlsen/sb_0101-0150/sb_132_bill_history.html>. 
55 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFO. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 6. 
56 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 13519(e) (2000). The instruction stresses the following: 
the importance of enforcing domestic violence laws; the accessibility of civil remedies, 
such as temporary restraining orders, and community resources, such as battered wo-
men shelters; and victim protection. [d. Police officers, the California State Bar Asso-
ciation, the California Women Lawyers' Association, domestic violence experts and at 
least one former victim of domestic violence, among others, developed these lessons. 
[d. at § 13519(d). This law seeks to improve police empathy for responding to, 
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That same year, the California legislature amended California 
Penal Code § 13701 to require law enforcement agencies to 
create written domestic violence response policies encouraging 
arrest of offenders. 57 Therefore, police officers' sensitivity to 
domestic violence is heightened. 
California has also received grants under VAWA to fur-
ther its efforts to prevent and respond to domestic violence. 58 
In addition to the 1999 VAWA funds, California allocated ap-
proximately $6.8 million for domestic violence programs to its 
Office of Criminal Justice Planning. 59 For example, in 1999 
the state legislature allocated over $5.5 million for rape pre-
vention efforts.60 . 
C. PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
In addition to federal and state legislative efforts to stem 
domestic violence, the state bar associations and courts (here-
inafter "disciplinary officials") have adopted active roles as 
well. When a perpetrator of domestic violence is an attorney, 
these disciplinary officials treat this as misconduct that nega-
tively impacts on an attorney's fitness to practice law.61 Cali-
fornia has developed an attorney disciplinary system to ad-
dress attorney misconduct. 
California's State Bar Court (hereinafter "State Bar 
preventing, and remedying domestic disputes on a continuing basis. See BUREAU OF 
CRIM. INFo. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 6. 
67 See BUREAU OF CRIM. INFo. AND ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 6. Under this law, 
police must attempt to ascertain the most significant aggressor of the domestic dis-
pute. The officer must consider the following factors in deciding who that aggressor 
is: (1) protecting the victim from continuing abuse; (2) threats of physical injury; (3) 
the history of domestic disputes between the parties involved; and (4) whether either 
person involved acted in self-defense. Although police may arrest both parties in-
volved, they are discouraged from doing so by having to decide who is the most sig-
nificant aggressor. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 13701(b) (2000). 
58 See Fiscal Summary: Hearing on S.B. 1B7 Before the Senate Comm. on Appro-
priations, 1994-1995 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1995) (showing $3 million received from the 
VAWA); Vwlence Against Women: Appropriation of Federal Funds: Hearing Before the 
Senate Comm. on Criminal Procedure, 1996-1997 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1997) (showing 
approximately $11.5 million received); S.B. 160, 1999-2000 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1999) 
(demonstrating receipt of almost $13 million under the VAWA). 
59 See S.B. 160, 1999-2000 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1999). 
60 See id. 
61 See Levin, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
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Court") hears and decides attorney discipline cases. 62 The 
State Bar Court may independently censure attorneys.63 For 
more severe attorney sanctions, such as suspension and dis-
barment, the State Bar Court makes findings of facts, conclu-
sions of law, and recommends the extent of discipline to the 
California Supreme Court.64 The Supreme Court then reviews 
the State Bar Court's findings and conclusions,65 then deter-
mines whether the recommended sanction is appropriate.66 If 
not, the Supreme Court may impose the sanction it deems ap-
propriate.67 The remainder of this section will discuss the rea-
soning for imposing professional discipline on domestically vi-
olent attorneys. 
Fitness to practice law involves more than being an effec-
tive lawyer;68 it also requires that a lawyer refrain from con-
duct that evinces disrespect for the law, the courts, and the 
legal profession.69 Although domestic violence is not directly 
related to the practice of law, courts nevertheless view acts of 
domestic violence as misconduct deserving of professional dis-
cipline for three primary reasons: preserving the integrity of 
the legal profession, protecting the public, and maintaining 
public confidence in the law. 70 A general discussion of the 
model guidelines for disciplining attorney misconduct dis-
closes the rationale behind imposing sanctions on attorneys 
for committing acts of domestic violence. 
62 See The California State Bar Court Website (visited November 19, 2000) <http:/ 
/www.calbar.org/DisciplineIBKG.htm> . 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id. 
66 See, e.g., Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 730. 
67 See id. at 737-739 (rejecting the State Bar Court's recommendation to suspend 
Nevill for five years and instead opting for disbarment). 
68 See, e.g., Painter, 739 A.2d 24. 
69 See id. 
70 See Karen A. Geraghty, Note, Bruising the Legal Profession: Attorney Disci-
pline for Acts of Domestic Violence, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 451 (1997). Thus, disciplinary of-
ficials have given no credence to the fact that domestic violence is a problem that 
generally lurks behind closed doors. See Mark Hansen, Big Brother Bar: Jury is Out 
on Disciplining Lawyer's Private Conduct, ABA JOURNAL, November 2000, at 14; See 
also, e.g., Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 736. 
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1. American Bar Association Guidelines 
The American Bar Association (hereinafter "ABA") states 
that a lawyer's responsibilities include conforming his or her 
conduct to the law both professionally and personally.71 To en-
sure this end, the ABA established the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (hereinafter "Model Rules")72 and the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter "Model 
Code").73 Although a majority of states continue to adopt ver-
sions of the Model Rules, thereby phasing out reliance on the 
Model Code, courts imposing lawyer discipline generally ad-
here to the standards of professional conduct in the Model 
Code, which closely parallel the Model Rules.74 
The stated goals of both the Model Rules and Model Code 
are to protect the public from morally deficient lawyers,75 bol-
ster public confidence in the legal profession,76 and maintain 
the integrity and competence of the bar.77 The Model Code 
further recommends that lawyers be "temperate and dignified, 
and [ . . . ] refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible 
conduct."7s Accordingly, the Model Code sets forth the mini-
mum standards of attorney conduct.79 Under the Model Code 
an attorney shall not: (1) violate a disciplinary rule,so (2) cir-
cumvent a disciplinary rule through another's actions,S! (3) 
engage in conduct involving moral turpitude,s2 (4) engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
71 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (hereinafter "MODEL RULES"), Pre-
amble, Paragraph 4 (1999). 
72 See id. Paragraph 6. 
73 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (hereinafter "MODEL CODE") 
Canon 1 (1983). 
74 See STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND 
STANDARDS 459 (2000). 
75 See MODEL CODE EC 1-2, EC 1-3; MODEL RULES Preamble, Paragraph 4. 
76 See MODEL CODE EC 1-5; see also MODEL RULES, Preamble, Paragraph 11 (dis-
cUBsing the profession's responsibility to conceive its self-regulation in the public 
interest). 
77 See MODEL CODE EC 1-1; see also MODEL RULES, Preamble, Paragraph 6. 
78 See MODEL CODE EC 1-5. 
79 See id. DR 1-102. 
80 See id. DR 1-102(A)(1). 
81 See id. DR 1-102(A)(2). 
82 See id. DR 1-102(A)(3). 
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tion,83 (5) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the adminis-
tration of justice,84 or (6) engage in any other conduct that ad-
versely reflects on his fitness to practice law.85 An attorney 
who violates any of these standards may be subject to profes-
sional discipline.86 In determining whether disciplinary action 
is required, the Model Rules suggest that the disciplinary offi-
cials assess the surrounding mitigating87 and aggravating88 
circumstances.89 Particularly important to this assessment are 
the willfulness of the misconduct, seriousness of the violation 
as well as the existence of any previous violations.90 
2. The Case for Imposing Sanctions on Domestically Violent 
Attorneys 
Most states have adopted versions of the Model Code and 
Model Rules. 91 Thus, the rationales given in attorney disci-
pline cases involving domestically violent attorneys generally 
mirror three of the six ABA standards listed above: (1) protec-
tion of the public, (2) enhancement of the administration of 
justice, and (3) preservation of public confidence in the legal 
profession.92 Yet, without explanation, few courts define acts 
of domestic violence as involving moral turpitude.93 Conduct 
involving moral turpitude is behavior that is contrary to mod-
ern day justice or morality.94 The moral turpitude factor is im-
portant to this Comment's proposal for imposing professional 
83 See MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(4). 
84 See id. DR 1-102(A)(5). 
85 See id. DR 1-102~A)(6). 
88 See Levin, supra note 4. 
87 See id. at 33 (identifying mitigating factors as including absence of prior pro-
fessional discipline, personal or emotional problems, mental disability, and chemical 
dependency). 
88 See id. (identifying aggravating factors as including the existence of prior dis-
cipline, a pattern of misconduct, and vulnerability of the victim). 
89 See MODEL CODE Scope, at Paragraph 5. 
90 See id. 
91 See Geraghty, supra note 70, at 469-470. 
92 See Levin, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
93 See Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (imposing a suspension of 1 year and 1 day); Run-
yon, 49 N.E. 2d 189 (imposing disbarment); Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798 (ordering in-
definite suspension). 
94 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1026 (7th ed. 1999) (hereinafter a reference to 
"censure" includes "reprimand" since they are interchangeable). 
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discipline on domestically violent attorneys.95 
Courts uniformly hold that domestically violent attorneys 
deserve professional discipline even though the conduct may 
not be directly related to the practice of law. 96 Accordingly, 
courts need only determine the appropriate professional sanc-
tion once an attorney is found to have committed an act of do-
mestic violence.97 
D. SANCTIONS CURRENTLY IMPOSED AGAINST DOMESTICALLY VIO-
LENT ATTORNEYS 
Courts throughout the nation impose discipline on attor-
neys for committing acts of domestic violence.98 These courts 
generally impose one of three levels of discipline: public cen-
sure or reprimand,99 suspension,lOO or disbarment. lOl The ex-
tent of discipline imposed on a domestically violent attorney is 
determined by an ad hoc, case-by-case analysis. lo2 As a result, 
no uniform sanction applies to acts of domestic violence. 
1. Censure or Reprimand 
A censure or reprimand is an official condemnation of an 
attorney for engaging in minor conduct that is subject to dis-
cipline. lo3 The censure is either public or private. In public 
censure, the state bar publicizes the censured attorney's 
name.104 But if the sanction is private censure, then the attor-
ney's name remains confidential. lo5 Public censure is the least 
severe discipline imposed upon domestically violent 
attorneys.106 
96 See discussion infra Part V.A. 
96 See Geraghty, supra note 70. 
97 See id. 
98 See cases cited supra note 1. 
99 See Senn, 824 P.2d 822 (ordering public censure); Principato, 655 A.2d 920 (or-
dering public reprimand); Magid, 655 A.2d 916 (ordering public reprimand). 
100 See cases cited supra note 2. 
101 See Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d 729; Runyon, 49 N.E. 2d 189; Painter, 739 A.2d 24. 
102 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROCEDURE OF STATE BAR, Title IV, Introduction 
(1986). 
103 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 94, at 216. 
104 See, e.g., 1 WITKIN CAL. PRoc. ATTYS § 668 (a) (2nd ed. 2000 Supp.). 
106 See id. 
106 See cases cited supra note 99; see also AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION Standards 
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The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Senn ordered 
public censure of a domestically violent attorney.107 In Senn, 
attorney Kenneth Senn came home drunk to an angry wife. lOS 
An argument ensued, which quickly escalated into a physical 
fight. After striking each other, Mrs. Senn ordered her hus-
band to leave.109 Senn refused, pulled out his wife's gun and 
pointed it at her. "I should kill you," he muttered. llo "Why 
don't you then?" she replied.lll Senn began up the stairs to 
sleep, gun still in hand. His wife followed behind him insist-
ing that he leave.1l2 Senn fired the gun several feet above her 
head to end the argument.113 Mrs. Senn phoned her parents.1l4 
Attorney Senn got on the line, spoke with them briefly, then 
left the house.115 The next day, the police arrested Senn for 
felony menacing and third degree assault. llS Although the 
prosecutor eventually dropped the charges, the Colorado Su-
preme Court ordered that attorney Senn be publicly 
censured. 117 
The Court found that Senn's actions deserved public cen-
sure because they displayed a "very critical failure of judg-
ment"llS and "evinced a contempt for the law which was at 
odds with [his] duty to uphold the law."1l9 The court reasoned 
that the goals of professional discipline are to bolster an at-
torney's respect for the law, and to protect the public against 
attorneys with bad judgment.120 Further, the court rejected 
Senn's argument that professional discipline was inappropri-
ate for conduct that is neither directly related to the lawyer's 
2.6, Commentary (recognizing that private censures are reserved for negligent attor-
ney conduct only). 
107 824 P.2d 822. 
108 See id. at 823. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. 
III See id. 
112 See Senn, 824 P.2d at 823. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See Senn, 824 P.2d at 823 (noting that acquittal of criminal charges does not 
necessarily bar disciplinary action). 
118 See id. at 824-825. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
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honesty and integrity nor indicates a conscious indifference to 
the law. l2l Although Senn argued that he no longer abused al-
cohol, and had reconciled with his wife, the court held that 
Senn's intentional conduct posed a "significant danger of seri-
ous injury," and thus warranted public censure.122 
2. Suspension 
Suspension from the practice of law is the courts' most 
commonly ordered sanction for domestically violent attor-
neys.123 Suspension is a disciplinary action that prohibits an 
attorney from practicing law, or even holding himself or her-
self out as being able to practice law, within the jurisdiction 
of the ordering court.124 The two types of suspension imposed 
are stayed suspension and actual suspension.125 Court ordered 
suspensions have ranged from a 3-year stayed suspension 
with a 30-day actual suspension126 to an actual indefinite sus-
pension with eligibility for reinstatement within 3 months.127 
In In ·re Hickey,128 the California Supreme Court sus-
pended a domestically violent attorney.129 In that case, while 
at a nightclub, an attorney struck his wife on the side of the 
head with a gun and fled before police arrived. 130 Hickey's 
wife ran to a neighbor's house. 131 Hickey followed her, 
threatened to hurt her, and then went home.132 Early the next 
morning, after Mrs. Hickey returned home she called "911," 
but when the police arrived she insisted that they leave. 133 
121 See id. 
122 See Senn, 824 P.2d at 824-825. 
123 See cases cited supra note 2. 
12-( See The State Bar of California Website, The Glossary of Terms Relating to At-
torney Discipline (visited January 20, 2001) <http://www.calbar.orglDiscipline/ 
Glossary.htm>. 
125 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROCEDURE OF STATE BAR, supra note 102, Stan-
dard 1.4 (recognizing stayed suspension, actual suspension and stayed suspension 
which includes an actual suspension as a condition). 
126 See, e.g., Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d 57!. 
127 See, e.g., Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798. 
128 50 Cal. 3d 57!. 
129 See id. 
130 See id. at 574-575. 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d at 574-575. 
15
Camarena: Attorney Discipline
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
170 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
Mrs. Hickey summoned the police again.134 Upon arrival, the 
police officers noticed Hickey walk out of his house with a 
handgun hidden in his waistband.135 Hickey was subsequently 
convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.136 
The California Supreme Court suspended Hickey from the 
practice of law for three years.137 The court stayed all but 30 
days of Hickey's suspension, but conditioned the stay upon 
completion of three years probation.13s Additionally, Hickey 
had to retake, and pass, California's professional responsibil-
ity examination within one year of the date of discipline.139 In 
determining the appropriateness of this sanction, the court 
considered another incident of domestic violence that had oc-
curred a month earlier between Hickey and his wife. 140 The 
Hickey court recognized that the primary purpose behind im-
posing professional sanctions on domestically violent attor-
neys is to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profes-
sion.141 Furthermore, by imposing discipline in these cases, 
the court .also maximizes professional standards and pre-
serves the public trust in attorneys. 142 
3. Disbarment 
Disbarment is the most severe professional sanction that 
a disciplinary court may impose on an attorney.143 Once a 
134 See id. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. at 575-576. 
138 See Hickey, 50 Cal. 3d at 575-576. 
139 See id. 
140 In that incident, Hickey slapped his wife's face for dancing with another man 
at a lounge. She tried to leave, but Hickey chased her. When he caught up with his 
wife, Hickey swung at her but missed. He pushed her instead. A by-stander yelled for 
Hickey to stop the beating, but he did not relent. Instead, Hickey ripped a metal sign 
from the ground and swung it at the by-stander's head. While being arrested, Hickey 
threatened to get his gun and shoot all of the by-standers. Ms. Hickey, shoeless and 
with blood dripping from her nose, told the police that this happened all the time and 
that her fear of Hickey made her hesitant to press charges against him. The charges 
of assault with a deadly weapon and spousal abuse were suspended on the condition 
that Hickey attend an Anger Awareness Program. See id. at 572. 
141 See, e.g., id. at 578. 
142 See id. 
143 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROCEDURE OF STATE BAR, supra note 102, Stan-
dard 1.2(c). 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss2/3
2001] ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 171 
court orders disbarment, an attorney is indefinitely expelled 
from the practice of law.144 However, a disbarred attorney may 
petition the court for reinstatement after a court-specified pe-
riod of time.145 Three courts nationwide have disbarred an at-
torney for acts of domestic violence. 146 
A California Supreme Court decision, In re Nevill,147 is 
the lead case. In Nevill, an attorney invited his wife to 
lunch. 148 When she refused, he became suspicious. 149 Nevill 
went to a friend's house. While there, Nevill snorted cocaine, 
smoked marijuana, and planned on finding someone to as-
sault his wife's lover.150 Nevill invited his wife to lunch again, 
but she declined.151 So he drove to her workplace, hid in the 
bushes, and watched her leave with another man. 152 Nevill 
tried to follow them but could not keep Up.153 He had drinks, 
snorted more cocaine, picked his daughter up from nursery 
school, and drove to his wife's office, where he confronted 
her.154 Nevill said he was leaving her and taking their child.155 
When he arrived home he hid a rifle on the bed under a 
sheet, began to pack, and snorted more cocaine. 156 When his 
wife arrived, he accused her of going to a hotel with her 
lover.157 She said that she had not slept with the man "this 
week."158 Nevill ordered her to call her lover, but she could not 
reach him.159 Nevill pulled the rifle from under the sheet and 
shot three rounds into the bedroom floor.160 Mrs. Nevill yelled, 
"You really are crazy aren't yoU?"161 Neville turned, fired ap-
144 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 94, at 475. 
145 See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROCEDURE OF STATE BAR, supra note 102. 
146 See cases cited supra note 101. 
147 39 Cal. 3d 729. 
148 See id. at 732-733. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 732-733. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 732-733. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
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proximately ten rounds and killed her. 162 
The Nevill court reiterated that the primary purpose of 
imposing discipline against attorneys is to protect the public, 
the courts, and the legal profession. 163 The Supreme Court 
reasoned that these protections were necessary as Nevill's ac-
tions had "displayed a dangerous volatility which might well 
prejudice his ability to effectively represent his clients' inter-
ests given the pressures associated with the practice of law."164 
Though Nevill offered several mitigating circumstances,165 the 
court disbarred him.166 In doing so, the court explained that 
disbarment would best protect the public because it facilitated 
a future evaluation of Nevill's future fitness to practice law 
through reappraisal, should Nevill ever seek reinstatement.l67 
That the lack of uniformity in lawyer discipline leads to 
the imposition of inconsistent sanctions in domestic violence 
cases is self-evident.168 Despite attempts to follow the ABA 
standards, disciplinary courts impose disparate degrees of dis-
cipline169 that often do not reflect the severity of the acts com-
mitted. Part III of this Comment explores the shortcomings of 
the current approach to imposing discipline on domestically 
violent attorneys. 
III. DISCUSSION 
As the cases outlined above demonstrate, disciplinary 
courts across the United States employ case-by-case analysis 
in determining the extent of discipline to be imposed against 
162 See Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 732-733. 
163 See id. at 735 
164 See id. 
166 The mitigating factors included marital disharmony, Nevill being under the 
influence of cocaine and alcohol the day of the incident, a vehement argument precip-
itated the killing, Nevill was serving an 8 year prison sentence, he had no prior disci-
pline, he was cooperative with disciplinary officials, and the killing was unrelated to 
the practice of law. See id. at 735-736. 
166 See id. at 737-738 (going beyond the recommended 5-year suspension, with 30 
months actual suspension, 5 years probation, quarterly reports to the bar, mandatory 
psychiatric treatment and abstinence from drugs). 
167 See Nevill, 39 Cal. 3d at 738-739 (recognizing that all disbarred attorneys, af-
ter five years, may seek reinstatement). 
168 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 4, at 37. 
169 See id. 
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an attorney for acts of domestic violence.17o This approach re-
sults in inconsistent and unpredictable sanctions.171 These re-
sults are the source of the problem to the current approach to 
attorney discipline.172 
A. ATTACK ON THE CURRENT ,ApPROACH TO DETERMINING THE 
SANCTION TO BE IMPOSED ON DOMESTICALLY VIOLENT ATTORNEYS 
The current approach solely applies case-by-case analysis, 
which leads to ambiguous standards and unpredictable out-
comes.173 Courts generally agree that an attorney's domesti-
cally violent acts are a legitimate basis for sanctions, yet no 
standards have been established for determining the extent of 
sanction to be imposedY4 From public reprimand175 to disbar-
ment,176 the range of sanctions is broad and often inconsis-
tent.177 In fact, the New Jersey Supreme Court is the only dis-
ciplinary authority that has imposed standard sanctions 
against domestically violent attorneys. It has, de facto, de-
cided that a 3-month actual suspension is the appropriate 
sanction in the majority of these cases.178 However, because 
the court is not bound to that sanction,179 disciplinary results 
are still unpredictable in New Jersey. 
Whenever courts apply case-by-case analysis the judicial 
process becomes less efficient because this approach is fact in-
tensive. 180 Under a fact-driven approach, the court ideally 
must compare the case at bar with every case in which courts 
have disciplined domestically violent attorneys to determine 
whether the appropriate discipline to impose is censure, sus-
170 See generally, Levin, supra note 4. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. 
173 See Levin, supra note 4, at 35-38. 
174 See id. at 38-39. 
175 See, e.g., Senn, 824 P.2d 822. 
176 See, e.g., Painter, 739 A.2d 24. 
177 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 4. 
178 See Howard, 673 A.2d 800; Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378; In re Toronto, 696 A.2d 
8 (N.J. 1998). The courts imposed a 3-month suspension in each of these cases. 
179 See, e.g., Principato, 655 A.2d at 919 (avowing to suspension as the appropri-
ate sanction for domestically violent attorneys but remaining silent as to the duration 
of such suspension); See also, Levin, supra note 4. 
180 See, e.g., Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Con-
frontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REV. 1, 44 (1987). . 
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pension, or disbarment. 181 Suspension is the most troublesome 
sanction because it further requires the court to square the 
law with the facts of the case at hand to justify the length of 
the suspension.182 Thus, case-by-case analysis injects an addi-
tional step into the disciplinary process that is unnecessarily 
time-consuming and wasteful of judicial resources. 
B. PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING PROFESSIONAL SANCTIONS ON DOMES-
TICALLY VIOLENT ATTORNEYS 
Some legal commentators argue against the propriety of 
subjecting domestically violent attorneys to professional disci-
pline.183 Opponents maintain that judicial sanctioning of do-
mestically violent attorneys allows the government to intrude 
into their private lives because the misconduct does not ordi-
narily arise from the rendering of professional services. l84 On 
the other hand, proponents of imposing discipline posit that 
even though domestic violence is not ordinarily committed in 
attorneys' professional capacity, such misconduct nevertheless 
indicates a lack of integrity and judgment that threaten both 
the Jtublic and the reputation of the legal profession.185 As the 
reasoning goes, attorneys violate the profession's ideals of 
honesty, trustworthiness, truthfulness, reliability and commit-
ment to the judicial process and the administration of justice 
by committing acts of domestic violence.186 Therefore, court-
imposed sanctions are proper though the underlying miscon-
duct may not be directly related to the practice of law.187 
181 See, Levin, supra note 4, at 44-46. 
182 See id. 
183 See Geraghty, supra note 70, at 485-488. 
184 See id. at 485 (citing Kevin Campbell, Letter, Fight the Lynch Mob Mentality 
in Domestic Violence Cases, 140 N.J.L.J. 36 (April 24, 1995». See also Hansen, supra 
note 70, at 14. 
185 See, e.g., Geraghty, supra note 70, at 486; see also Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 
800-801. 
186 See, e.g., Principato, 655 A.2d 920. 
187 See Geraghty, supra note 70, at 485-488. See also, e.g., Musick, 960 P.2d 89 
(noting that the fact that misconduct is not directly related to the practice of law con-
sequently becomes relegated to a mere factor in determining the extent of discipline 
and not determinative of whether to impose discipline). Furthermore, in contrast to 
the disciplinary authorities of other professions, courts consistently hold attorneys to 
higher standards of professional responsibility for engaging in conduct that is not di-
rectly related to the practice of law. See Geraghty, supra, at 487-488. For example, 
20
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Critics also complain that professional discipline for acts 
of domestic violence exposes attorneys to dual punishment. ISS 
The rationale for this conclusion is that criminal law provides 
sufficient punishment for those who commit domestic vio-
lence. lS9 Thus, when attorneys are professionally sanctioned 
as well, they are unnecessarily punished twice.190 Courts gen-
erally circumvent this argument by recognizing that the pri-
mary goal of attorney discipline is not to punish but to protect 
the public and preserve the reputation of the legal 
profession. 191 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE QUASI-CRIMINAL NATURE OF ATTORNEY 
DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS 
Disciplinary courts generally characterize attorney disci-
plinary proceedings as being neither criminal nor civil in na-
ture.192 Instead, courts describe these proceedings as quasi-
criminal.193 Therefore, attorney discipline proceedings are 
unique194 and thus implicate distinct procedural quandaries. 195 
First and foremost, an attorney facing professional disci-
pline is not presumed innocent until proven guilty.196 Second, 
the state bar need not prove the attorney's alleged misconduct 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 197 Instead, the state bar need only 
physicians are rarely disciplined for misconduct that is not directly related to the 
practice of medicine. See id. at 487. Additionally, professional athletes are seldom dis-
. ciplined by their leagues for private misconduct, such as committing an act of domes-
tic violence. See id. For example, in a recent case, Jason Kidd, of the Phoenix Suns 
basketball team, admitted to hitting his wife and cutting her lip after an all-day ar-
gument. He voluntarily sat out about six games so that he could attend to his' marital 
problems. See Associated Press, Kidd to Leave Suns to Work Out Problems with His 
Wife (visited January 20, 2001) <http://sports.exCite.com/nbalnews/010120/sl-sports-
nba-3389579>. 
188 See Geraghty, supra note 70, at 488. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 See, e.g., Howard, 673 A.2d at 802; see also 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 623. 
192 See Helen Chun Parker, Note, Attorneys Who Plead the Fifth: How the Self-
Incrimination Provision Applies to New Jersey Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings, 27 
RUTGERS L. J. 493, 498 (1996). 
193 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 624(b). 
194 See Parker, supra note 192, at 498. 
195 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 623. 
196 See id. § 623(a). 
197 See id. § 624(a). 
21
Camarena: Attorney Discipline
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
176 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
prove that the attorney has committed the prohibited acts by 
clear and convincing evidence.198 Third, the technical rules of 
evidence as applied in criminal· trials do not apply to discipli-
nary proceedings.199 The evidence need only be legally suffi-
cient for the court to consider it at a disciplinary hearing.200 
Fourth, the entrapment defense is not available to attorneys 
charged with disciplinary violations that stem from criminal 
offenses,201 such as domestic violence. Accordingly, although 
the defendant attorney may allege entrapment as a defense to 
criminal charges, disciplinary courts may nevertheless impose 
professional sanctions because the state bar did not commit 
the entrapment.202 Finally, an unreasonable delay, without a 
showing of prejudice, in bringing a disciplinary proceeding 
does not mandate dismissal, as it would in the criminal 
context.203 
These procedural differences fail to recognize that a 
state's challenge to an attorney's license to practice law puts 
as much at stake as in some criminal proceedings.204 The pos-
sibility of disbarment jeopardizes an attorney's entire liveli-
hood.205 Thus, an attorney facing disciplinary sanctions should 
be entitled to the same legal protections provided in a crimi-
nal proceeding.206 For this reason, attorneys are guaranteed 
the privilege against self-incrimination in disciplinary hear-
ings.207 But overall, attorney discipline proceedings afford the 
accused higher standards of protection, such as requiring 
clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponder-
ance, and thus recognize that these matters risk significantly 
198 See id. 
199 See id. § 623(b). 
200 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 624(b) (citing In re Richardson, 209 Cal. 492 
(1930)). 
201 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 623(d) (citing Wong v. State Bar, 15 Cal.3d 
528 (1975)). 
202 See id.· (distinguishing Patty v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 9 Cal.3d 356 
(1973)). 
203 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 623(e) (recognizing, however, that unreasona-
ble delay may be considered as a mitigating factor). 
204 See id. § 623. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. 
207 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 624 (noting that the right to invoke the 5th 
Amendment in disciplinary hearings may in fact work against the attorney since co-
operation in the process is considered a mitigating factor by many courts). 
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more than do civil actions.20B 
Court decisions to impose discipline on domestically vio-
lent attorneys are nevertheless open to further scrutiny. First, 
disciplinary courts have not adequately impressed the serious-
ness of domestic violence upon the public and errant attor-
neys. Second, courts have failed to ease the judicial process 
for determining the appropriate level of professional sanction 
to be imposed on attorneys who engage in domestic violence. 
Part IV expands on these concerns. 
IV. CRITIQUE 
The primary problem with the current treatment is that 
courts rarely characterize an attorney's acts of domestic vio-
lence as misconduct that involves moral turpitude.209 Courts 
generally define moral turpitude as a base, vile, or depraved 
act in the private and social duties a person owes to others 
that is contrary to the accepted and customary right and duty 
between persons.210 Disappointingly, only three disciplinary 
courts have fit domestic violence into that definition for pur-
poses of imposing attorney sanctions.2l1 
The first case that declared attorney domestic violence to 
be conduct involving moral turpitude was Committee on ProfZ 
Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. Patterson.212 
In that case, Patterson met a woman at a class.213 They be-
came romantically involved.214 A few months later, Patterson's 
girlfriend met with her former husband for dinner. 215 Al-
though she had told Patterson that she was meeting a girl-
friend, he found out that she had lied.216 Patterson went to 
her home and confronted her.217 Despite her confession, he be-
208 See, e.g., Levin, supra note 4, at 19 (urging that attorney discipline proceed-
ings are closer to criminal than not). 
209 See cases cited supra note 93. These are the only three cases that have de-
fined the attorneys' acts of domestic violence as conduct involving moral turpitude. 
210 See, e.g., In re Calaway, 20 Cal. 3d 165 (1977). 
211 See cases cited supra note 93. 
212 369 N.W.2d 798. 
213 See id. at 799-800. 
214 See id. 
215 See id. 
216 See Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 799-800. 
217 See id. 
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gan striking her and tore off her clothes.218 Mter beating her 
for about two hours,219 Patterson cared for his girlfriend's 
wounds.220 Soon afterwards, Patterson left the state and 
sought psychiatric help.221 He took the clothing he had torn off 
of his victim during the beating out of state and destroyed 
it. 222 Patterson pled guilty to the criminal charges that 
followed. 223 
The Iowa Supreme Court suspended Patterson from the 
practice of law for an indefinite term for his acts of domestic 
violence.224 However, the court declared his license eligible for 
reinstatement after three months.225 In doing so, the Patterson 
court recognized that the purpose of attorney discipline is to 
preserve public confidence in the legal profession and bolster 
the layperson's respect for the law.226 The court described Pat-
terson's misconduct "as morally reprehensible [as] accepting 
gifts in violation ofa federal statute limiting attorney fees; 
having possession of marijuana and amphetamines; or making 
obscene phone calls."227 Accordingly, the Patterson court found 
the attorney's acts of domestic violence to be conduct involv-
ing moral turpitude. 228 
The second case in which a court defined an attorney's 
acts of domestic violence as involving moral turpitude was In 
re Runyon, an Indiana Supreme Court case.229 In Runyon, an 
attorney forced his way into his former spouse's apartment, 
struck her with a club, and held her at gunpoint with an M-
10 machine gun.230 Runyon surrendered after the apartment 
manager let the police into the apartment.231 Mter assuring 
218 See id. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. (noting that pictures of the victim taken the next day evidenced Pat-
terson's skill as a martial artist). 
221 See Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 799-800. 
222 See id. 
223 See id. 
224 See id. at 800-801. 
225 See id. (opting to order suspension rather than follow the state bar's recom-
mended censure). 
228 See Patterson, 369 N.W.2d at 800-801. 
227 See id. at 801. 
228 See id. at 800-801. 
229 491 N.E.2d 190. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
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that Runyon had not physically injured the victim,232 the po-
lice arrested him. Runyon was convicted of unlawful posses-
sion of firearms.233 
The Indiana Supreme Court consequently disbarred Run-
yon.234 The court reasoned that Runyon's acts were heinous, 
regardless of his motive, intent or mental state. 235 The Run-
yon court stated that it had a' duty to protect the public from 
unfit lawyers, whatever the cause.236 Accordingly, the court 
defined Runyon's violence as acts of moral turpitude that re-
flected adversely on his fitness to practice law.237 
The only other case to date that has defined attorney do-
mestic violence as involving moral turpitude is People v. 
Brailsford.238 In that case, an attorney with the Colorado At-
torney General's office was convicted of committing third-
degree sexual assault against his wife. 239 In March 1989, 
while his wife was sleeping on the couch, Brailsford got on top 
of her, pinned her down, and undressed her.240 She resisted by 
yelling "No" and hitting him on the back with her fists.241 But 
he did not relent and forced her to have sex with him.242 Dur-
ing the attack, Mrs. Brailsford had difficulty breathing, and 
experienced a lot of pain.243 After the attack, she complained 
of chest and leg pain.244 
The Colorado Supreme Court suspended Brailsford from 
practicing law for one year and a day.245 The court also re-
quired him to petition for reinstatement at the end of the ac-
tual suspension term and to attend group therapy to address 
232 See id. 
233 See id. 
234 See Runyon, 491 N.E.2d 190. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. 
238 933 P.2d 592 (holding that the acts of domestic violence involved moral 
turpitude). 
239 See id. at 594. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. (noting that while Brailsford weighed over 255 pounds, his wife was 
much smaller and suffered from asthma attacks). 
242 See id. 
243 See Brailsford, 933 P.2d at 594. 
244 See id. 
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his violent tendencies.246 The court found the following aggra-
vating factors: (1) his wife testified that Brailsford had beaten 
her throughout the marriage;247 (2) he attacked his victim in 
the middle of the night in the privacy of their home;248 (3) 
Brailsford was disparately larger than his wife;249 and (4) he 
knowingly inflicted harm on his victim.250 Despite a number of 
mitigating factors,251 the Brailsford court held that Brails-
ford's conduct involved moral turpitude, which reflected ad-
versely on his fitness to practice law. 252 
The common thread in these three cases is that the 
courts have defined the attorney misconduct as involving 
moral turpitude. However, the reason these courts reached 
that conclusion where other courts have failed to do so is un-
clear. The following analysis gives insight. Firstly, all three 
victims were women. But this fact seems insignificant, as all 
the cases cited by this Comment involve attorneys committing 
acts of domestic violence against women. Secondly, Patterson 
and Brailsford involved sexual assault. In Patterson, although 
there was no accusation of rape, the attorney tore off his vic-
tim's clothing, whereas in Brailsford the attorney raped his 
victim. Finally, Patterson used his martial art mastery to 
badly injure his victim, Brailsford used his overbearing size to 
force his victim into having sex with him, and Runyon bur-
glarized his victim's home armed with a machine gun.253 In 
sum, these cases involved attorneys who preyed on especially 
vulnerable victims by extraordinary means of force or violence 
likely prompted the Runyon, Patterson and Brailsford courts 
to define the attorneys' acts as involving moral turpitude. 
Accordingly, the Patterson court stated that the attorney's 
misconduct clearly met the definition of moral turpitude 
246 See id. (imposing this sanction as opposed to a public censure and conditions 
recommended by the lower disciplining body). 
247 See id. 
248 See Brailsford, 933 P.2d at 596. 
249 See id. 
250 See id. 
251 See id. at 595 (recognizing no prior discipline, candor, cooperation, criminal 
sanctions, loss of his job, public and editorial comment on the incident, remorse, sub-
stantial interim rehabilitation, a clear understanding of wrongfulness, and psycholog-
ical improvement as mitigating factors). 
252 See id. at 595-596. 
253 491 N.E.2d 189. 
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based on the incident.254 The Runyon court concluded that the 
evidence adduced at the underlying criminal trial proved that 
the attorney's misconduct involved moral turpitude.255 And in 
the most recent of these cases, the Brailsford court defined 
the underlying domestic violence as involving moral turpitude 
because the attorney sexually assaulted his victim.256 
Exemplary of the current inadequate treatment of domes-
tically violent attorneys is a Maryland Supreme Court case, 
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Painter.257 The 
Painter court was presented with a case where it should have 
declared the attorney's domestic violence to be base, vile acts 
contrary to modern day social mores and thus involving moral 
turpitude. Yet, it failed to do so. 
In Painter, an attorney repeatedly beat his wife and chil-
dren over the course of almost twenty years.258 For instance, 
Painter once gave his son a black eye for his first birthday.259 
On another occasion, Painter grabbed his son and beat his 
head against the wall for turning on the wrong fan switch.260 
When his wife and her sister tried to intervene, he called his 
sister-in-law "a stupid, fucking bitch."261 Painter also threw 
his son against walls and choked him on occasion.262 As for 
his daughter, he verbally abused her by calling her a "fucking 
brat."263 Even worse, when she was in the first grade, Painter 
told his daughter that "[she] was nothing but a fucking, god-
damn bitch, just like [her] mother."264 He also physically 
abused his daughter. He once grabbed her around the neck, 
choked her, and shook her for accidentally messing his hair.265 
When she was five, Painter punched his daughter while they 
were in a restaurant for refusing to drink orange juice.266 He 
254 See 369 N.W.2d at 801. 
255 See 491 N.E.2d at 190. 
256 See 933 P.2d at 596. 
257 See 739 A.2d 24. 
258 See id. at 26-27. 
259 See id. 
260 See id. 
261 See id. 
262 See Painter, 739 A.2d at 26-27. 
263 See id. 
264 See id. 
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
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also beat and kicked her dog and threw it off the second story 
deck.267 
Painter's behavior towards his wife was equally reprehen-
sible. He beat her regularly, starting on their honeymoon.268 
Painter beat her head against the garage floor, swung a 
hatchet at her, and called her a "goddamn fucking bitch."269 
Then he jumped on her, and pounded her head.270 Finally, 
Mrs. Painter, fed up, left to her mother's home. After Painter 
promised to never abuse her again, she returned home.271 But 
the violent cycle continued. Painter knocked her out of a 
chair, jumped on her and beat her. She freed herself and ran 
outside of the house.272 Painter followed her out, "kicked her, 
cursed her, choked her, bashed her head and pulled her 
hair."273 When Painter threatened to kill himself or her, she fi-
nally secured a protective court order.274 But that did not stop 
his abusive attempts. Mrs. Painter noticed her husband 
parked down the block from her home, so she phoned the po-
lice.275 When the officers arrested him, they found two loaded 
guns.276 
Finding no mitigating factors, the court disbarred 
Painter.277 It reasoned that Painter showed no appreciable in-
sight or explanation for his pattern of violence that spanned 
16 years.278 Furthermore, because he had been subjected to 
prior discipline for striking a former girlfriend and threaten-
ing her with a gun, Painter deserved disbarment.279 
But, despite the egregious acts of violence against his 
family, the court did not characterize Painter's acts of domes-
tic violence as conduct involving moral turpitude.280 The grue-
267 See Painter, 739 A.2d at 26-27. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. 
270 See id. 
271 See id. 
272 See Painter, 739 A.2d at 26-27. 
273 See id. 
274 See id. 
275 See id. 
276 See id. 
277 See Painter, 739 A.2d at 29. 
278 See id. 
279 See id. 
280 See generally Painter, 739 A.2d 24. 
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some abuse to which Painter subjected his family presented 
the perfect opportunity for the Maryland court to declare an 
attorney's acts of domestic violence as base, vile and contrary 
to modern day social mores. However, the Painter court held 
that the acts were merely prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.281 This is an incredible understatement, unreflective of 
the serious problem domestic violence presents to society. 
The abuse in Painter was more egregious than the acts of 
domestic violence in Patterson, Runyon and Brailsford, which 
did determine the misconduct involved moral turpitude. First, 
the abuse in Painter occurred over a prolonged period rather 
than on a single isolated occasion.282 Painter violently beat 
and verbally abused his wife and children over the course of 
approximately twenty years.283 In comparison, Patterson se-
verely beat and disfigured his girlfriend in a single incident of 
violence,284 while Runyon forced his way into his girlfriend's 
apartment, held her at gunpoint and struck her with a club 
on a single occasion. Further, Brailsford forced his wife to 
have sex with him on one occasion.285 No one could disagree 
that each of these cases, including Painter, involved base and 
vile acts of domestic violence that are contrary to modern day 
social mores. However, the severity of the violence, combined 
with the long cycle of abuse involved in Painter makes a very 
strong case for misconduct involving moral turpitude. In fact, 
Painter presents an even stronger case than Runyon and 
Brailsford, considering that the violence in those cases oc-
curred only on a single occasion and the harm was minimal, 
whereas in Painter prolonged abuse was not only aimed at the 
wife but also at the children. Based on the foregoing analysis, 
there was no legitimate reason for the Painter court not to de-
fine the abusive acts as involving moral turpitude. This is es-
pecially alarming in cases, such as Painter, where courts rec-
ognize domestic violence as a serious problem in modern day 
society,286 yet paradoxically fail to define the underlying acts 
281 See id. at 32. 
282 See, e.g., id. at 30 (recognizing the fact that the incident was isolated as a 
mitigating factor). 
283 See id. at 29. 
284 369 N.W.2d 798. 
285 933 P.2d 592 . 
286 739 A.2d at 29. 
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of domestic violence as base, vile conduct that is contrary to 
modern day social mores.287 
Under disciplinary courts' current approach to imposing 
professional discipline on domestically violent attorneys, out-
comes are unpredictable; the process is inefficient; and the de-
cisions are inconsistent, except that suspension is the favored 
sanction. Moreover, only three courts have characterized at-
torneys' acts of domestic violence as conduct involving moral 
turpitude. Consequently, courts have not completely recog-
nized the serious problem that domestic violence presents to 
our society, at least when it comes to imposing attorney 
discipline. 
v. PROPOSAL 
Courts uniformly insist that the primary goal of imposing 
attorney sanctions is not to punish misbehaved or errant at-
torneys.288 Instead attorney discipline is designed to protect 
the public, defend the reputation of the legal profession, and 
preserve public confidence in lawyers.289 Punishment may not 
be the primary court-professed goal of imposing these sanc-
tions, yet there are concomitant punitive effects that must 
nonetheless be considered. More importantly, few disciplinary 
courts enlist the rehabilitative opportunity attorney sanction 
proceedings provide. 
A. REVITALIZING CALIFORNIA'S FORMER APPROACH TO IMPOSING 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE FOR MISCONDUCT THAT INVOLVES MORAL 
TuRPITUDE 
Disciplinary courts have used many approaches to impos-
ing discipline on misbehaved or errant attorneys.290 For exam-
ple, in the 1950's, California entertained a unique system for 
disciplining attorneys who committed crimes involving moral 
turpitude. When an attorney was convicted of a crime, the 
287 See, e.g. Painter, 739 A.2d 24. 
288 See, e.g., Stephen G. Bene, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Ap-
proach to Lawyer Disciplinary Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907, 912-915 (1991). 
289 See id. 
290 See generally id. (urging the consideration of monetary sanctions in attorney 
discipline); see also Levin, supra note 4, at 83 (urging for detailed written standards 
regarding imposing attorney discipline to bolster the efficacy of the process). 
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normal procedures for imposing professional discipline did not 
apply.291 Instead, the criminal trial court forwarded the attor-
ney's conviction record to the California Supreme Court.292 
The Supreme Court then automatically suspended the attor-
ney from the practice of law.293 Once the conviction became fi-
nal,294 the high court considered the facts of the case to deter-
mine whether the attorney's conduct involved acts of moral 
turpitude.295 If so, the court disbarred the attorney.296 In the 
mid-1950's, the uncertainty of the 'moral turpitude' test gave 
way to legislation and disciplinary rules enacted to remedy 
difficulties that resulted from the automatic suspension and 
disbarment procedure.297 However, these problems are other-
wise resolvable to allow the moral turpitude test to be 
revived. 
For purposes of attorney discipline, the state bar should 
define domestic violence as conduct involving moral turpitude 
per se.298 This approach would eliminate the uncertainty 
presented by the moral turpitude test. Thus, upon filing crim-
inal charges against an attorney for committing acts of do-
mestic violence, the prosecutor's office would submit a copy of 
its entire case file to the disciplinary court. This would pro-
vide the court with two primary benefits. Firstly, the justices 
would have time to prepare for any subsequent disciplinary 
proceedings. Secondly, the decision would not rest solely on a 
"bare bones" conviction record. Once conviction of domestic vi-
olence is final, the court should then impose the appropriate 
discipline against the attorney, as set forth in Section B im-
291 See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 526 (1) (citing In re Rothrock, 25 Cal. 2d 588, 
589 (1944». 
292 See id. 
293 See id. 
294 A conviction is considered final when the time for appeal has expired and no 
appeal had been filed, or if an appeal has been filed it has been denied or the convic-
tion has been affirmed. See 1 WITKIN, supra note 104, § 530(b). 
295 See id. § 529(a). 
296 See id. § 526(1) (citing Rothrock, 25 C.2d at 589). 
297 See id. 
298 This would circumvent the requirement of courts to determine on a case-by-
case basis whether the attorney's conduct involved moral turpitude by automatically 
defining an attorney's criminal conviction for domestic violence as involving moral 
turpitude. Thus the uncertainty of the moral turpitude test that triggered its abolish-
ment in the 1950's would no longer be a factor. 
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mediately below.299 This system will not only better protect 
the public, but also afford accused attorneys the benefit of dis-
cipline being dependent on criminal conviction with all the at-
tendant safeguards of those proceedings. Furthermore, the at-
torney discipline process will be more consistent and 
predictable. 
B. CAPITALIZING ON THE REHABILITATIVE OPPORTUNITY THAT AT-
TORNEY DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS PROVIDE 
Beyond mere censure or suspension, courts should uni-
formly impose sanctions geared toward rehabilitation on at-
torneys who are convicted of domestic violence.30o Requiring 
attorneys to attend counseling, volunteer their legal services 
to the less fortunate, and otherwise make restitution will fur-
ther impress upon these offenders the seriousness of their 
acts. Such an approach will also grant to those attorneys who 
are amenable the opportunity for betterment. Thus, the of-
fending attorney, the legal profession, and the public will reap 
the full benefits that disciplinary proceedings offer. However, 
more severe sanctions must remain available to courts to 
properly address more severe acts of domestic violence. 
1. Sanctions for Less Serious First-Time Offenders 
Rehabilitative measures recognize the relationship be-
tween the stresses associated with practicing law and attor-
ney misconduct.301 Of course, one attorney's first incident of 
domestic violence may be more serious than another attor-
ney's first incident, but this qualitative difference can be ac-
299 When a complaint is brought to the direct attention of the state bar that an 
attorney allegedly committed acts of domestic violence, the state bar must relay the 
complaint to the prosecutor's office so that criminal proceedings can begin. When the 
conviction is final, the state bar may begin discipline proceedings. However, since ac-
quittal or non-prosecution is not determinative on the administration of attorney 
sanctions, the state bar must provide for an independent hearing in those circum-
stances to determine whether the alleged acts of domestic violence occurred. If so, 
then the state bar must subject the attorney to sanctions pursuant to this proposal. 
300 See, e.g., John D. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 355, 379 (1986) (urging that criminal sanctions could be considered discipline for 
attorney misconduct). 
301 See Levin, supra note 4, at 23-25. 
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counted for. 302 For the purposes of attorney discipline, a less 
serious offense should include the following traits.303 The inci-
dent did not leave physical or mental injury to the victim. For 
example, incidents that resulted in no physical markings, 
abrasions, bleeding, broken bones, or mental torture, such as 
false imprisonment, or threats, such as a threat to take the 
children away, or did not involve the use of a weapon belong 
in this category. In these less-serious, isolated incidents, attor-
ney sanctions should be geared more toward rehabilitation.304 
Accordingly, disciplinary officials should establish the follow-
ing rehabilitative measures to bolster the efficacy of tradi-
tional attorney sanctions. 
First, public censure should be mandatory for any domes-
tic violence serious enough to come to the attention of the 
state bar. This measure would have a deterrent effect in that 
it is a public admonishment.305 Additionally, it would inform 
the public of the misconduct, enabling people to make a more 
informed decision of whether to retain the services of these 
attorneys. Public censure will also display to the public the 
"no nonsense" attitude that disciplinary officials take toward, 
even first-time, less-serious, domestically violent attorneys. 
Second, courts should require these attorneys to attend a 
domestic violence prevention program (hereinafter "DVPP").306 
Forums such as these will allow the domestically violent at-
torney to recognize the causes of stress that is associated with 
the day-to-day demands of the legal profession. The offender 
will also be taught how to identify his anger before it esca-
302 See generally id. (suggesting that a delicate balance between uniformity of 
discipline and consideration of the particular facts of the case is necessary to impose 
effective lawyer sanctions). 
303 This minimal use of case-by-case analysis is necessary and useful for distin-
guishing the varying degrees of severity of domestic violence in attorney discipline 
cases. Furthermore, it is the disparity in sanctions that this Comment is concerned 
with most and thus urges that case-by-case analysis in determining the extent of at-
torney sanction is inappropriate and unnecessary. 
304 Domestically violent attorneys should be automatically placed on probation as 
an enforcement device rather than a merely punitive one. 
305 See Levin, supra note 4, at 21-23. 
306 In recognition that at times domestic violence is the fault not of one but of 
both persons involved, courts should give due consideration to attorneys who volunta-
rily attend marriage or relationship counseling in addition to the mandatory domestic 
violence prevention program. Courts should also consider mandating substance and! 
or alcohol abuse intervention programs should such abuse be a concern in the case. 
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lates into violent acts. The program will also offer insight on 
how to deal with misplaced anger. Encouraging these attor-
neys to properly channel their tension should, in turn, reduce 
the risk of domestic violence. 
Third, courts should mandate that domestically violent 
attorneys contribute a minimum number of hours of pro bono 
legal aid. Though it may be impractical to require that these 
attorneys become experts in all areas of law, the average at-
torney should be able to handle uncontested divorces, filing 
and serving temporary restraining orders, simple custody is-
sues, and simple estate planning. However, when a matter is 
particularly complicated then the attorney should be required 
to assist attorneys who are experts in these areas. For exam-
ple, domestically violent attorneys should be required to assist 
prosecutors assigned to the domestic violence caseload. This 
would allow the offenders to understand the seriousness of do-
mestic violence, while granting greatly needed aid to the 
overburdened criminal justice system. Consequently, these at-
torneys would also be afforded an opportunity to understand 
the ill effect domestic violence has on the legal system as a 
whole. 
2. Sanctions for Repeat or More Severe First-Time Offenders 
Attorneys who have violated a prior condition of proba-
tion for domestic violence or committed a more severe inci-
dent of domestic violence deserve harsher treatment.307 The 
above-recommended treatment should be required of these at-
torneys as well, but to a more severe degree. For example, 
courts should require more DVPP sessions, a longer pro bono 
commitment, as well as a lengthier probationary period. How-
ever, the sanctions must not end there. The more serious inci-
dents or recidivism should mandate suspension from the prac-
tice of law for at least six months. 308 Courts should also 
impose substantial fines against these attorneys and dis-
tribute the funds to various charitable causes that further 
307 See, e.g., Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378 (recognizing an abusive pattern as an ag-
gravating factor for determining the appropriate level of lawyer sanction). 
308 The lengths are somewhat arbitrary but it is the uniformity of application 
that will justify them. 
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anti-domestic violence efforts.309 
Attorneys who commit a subsequent act of domestic vio-
lence, despite being subjected to the foregoing sanctions must 
be disbarred. Domestically violent attorneys, who recidivate, 
permanently tarnish the reputation of the legal profession. 
Thus, recidivists deserve the severest sanction.310 Moreover, 
while the lower levels of sanctions may be labeled as being 
geared toward specific deterrence and rehabilitation of the of-
fending attorney, this final level of sanction goes further. The 
threat of disbarment will further general deterrence. That is, 
those domestically violent attorneys in the two lower tiers of 
sanction will know what awaits them should they recidivate. 
Such swift, certain, and severe sanctions will ensure that 
courts will not stand idly by while the confidence in the legal 
profession is threatened by violent attorneys with no respect 
for the law. 
C. C~EATING INCENTIVE FOR STATES TO ADOPT THIS PROPOSED 
APPROACH TO DISCIPLINING DOMESTICALLY VIOLENT ATTORNEYS 
Revamping the system cannot stop with attorney disci-
pline. Congress must also enact legislation, similar to the 
VAWA, which provides additional monetary incentives for 
states to adopt approaches like the one that is set forth above. 
The VAWA provides grants to states that demonstrate a gen-
eral commitment to increased arrests or lengthier incarcera-
tion of violent offenders.311 Once granted, these funds are 
earmarked to facilitate the prevention of violence against 
women.312 
VAWA funding is necessary and helpful, but more is 
needed. Thus Congress must authorize appropriations to 
states whose high courts have demonstrated a general com-
mitment to facilitating the ease, predictability, and judicial ef-
ficiency of imposing attorney sanctions in domestic violence 
cases. Congress should provide grants to states that have im-
plemented state bar rules that define domestic violence as a 
crime involving moral turpitude. Congress should also grant 
309 See Bene, supra note 288. 
310 See, e.g., Margrabia, 695 A.2d 1378. 
311 See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text. 
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funds to states that have implemented rules of state bar pro-
cedure that include a definite and structured scheme of sanc-
tions, such as the scheme set forth above. The legislation 
should provide additional grants to those states that have 
provided for a rehabilitative approach for certain qualified of-
fenders, such as first-time, less-severe domestic violence of-
fenders. Congress should also grant funds to states that 
demonstrate adherence to a system of attorney discipline 
based on the moral turpitude test, at least for non-
professional criminal offenses, such as domestic violence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Disciplinary courts have inconsistently sanctioned domes-
tically violent attorneys. Though suspension is the most often 
imposed sanction, no standards guide the process. The rea-
sons that justify attorney sanctions in these cases may gener-
ally reflect ABA guidelines, but that is not enough. A consis-
tent and predictable system of attorney discipline is needed, 
particularly when disciplinary officials are sanctioning con-
duct that involves moral turpitude, such as domestic violence. 
Even more concerning, few disciplinary courts have made the 
connection between domestic violence and moral turpitude de-
spite the serious threat domestic violence presents to Ameri-
can society. 
Consequently, a complete revamping of the current ap-
proach to imposing discipline on domestically violent attor-
neys is needed. In addition to protecting the public and pre-
serving the integrity of the legal profession, a disciplinary 
system must also provide an errant attorney with an opportu-
nity for rehabilitation; an aspect currently lacking in the at-
torney discipline process. The uniformity in discipline that 
would flow from the proposed approach will also better ad-
dress current concerns, such as ease of application and pre-
dictability of sanction. Judicial efficiency and fairness in the 
disciplinary process will also be maximized. Accordingly, the 
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time has come to shelve the current approach to imposing dis-
cipline on domestically violent attorneys and breathe new life 
into the process. 
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